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By Dugald O. Black and Jacob C. Moser 
SUMMARY 
An airplane was experimentally crashed to study the performance of 
a prototype crash-fire inerting system for reciprocating-eugine-powered 
airplanes. The results of previous experimental crashes indi cate that 
the crash conditions imposed almost always result in fire. The inerting 
system was therefore exposed to conditions that would adequately test 
its ability to inert and de-energize the various ignition sources known 
to cause crash fires. 
The fact that fire did not occur during this crash indicated that 
the crash-fire inerting system functioned satisfactorily as a complete 
unit. The prototype inerting system functioned with a rapidity equal to 
or greater than that of the experimental system used in the NACA crash-
fire studies. 
INTRODUCTION 
A commercial version of an NACA crash-fire prevention system for 
reciprocating-engine-powered airplanes, based on results of the crash-fire 
program reported in reference 1, has been built for the U. S. Air Force 
by Walter Kidde & Company, Inc. The performance of this prototype system 
was studied by the NACA in a full-scale experimental crash. This crash-
fire prevention system includes an "initiating system" which senses that 
a crash has occurred, and an "inerting system" which inerts the var~ous 
ignition sources that can start a crash fire. Only the performanCe of 
the inerting system is described in this report. 
The performance of the inerting system was studied by installing it 
in a properly instrumented C-82 airplane that was subsequently crashed. 
The crash conditions imposed almost always resulted in fire when no fire-
prevention system was used. The inerting system was therefore exposed to 
conditions that would adequately test its ability to inert and de-energize 
the various ignition sources known to cause crash fires. 
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CRASH-FIRE IGNITION-SOURCES INERTING SYSTEM 
The crash-~ire ignition-sources inerting system is composed o~ ~our 
main components arranged to ~unction automatically upon airplane crash: 
(1) A ~uel shut-o~~ valve on each ~ire wall and in the tubing be-
tween each carburetor metering section and ~uel injection nozzle; 
an oil shut-o~~ valve on each ~ire wall 
(2) A storage and plumbing system in each nacelle for discharging 
carbon dioxide into the d~~user housing o~ the engine induction 
system 
(3) A storage and plumbing system in each nacelle ~or spraying a 
coolant on the hot exhaust collector ring and heat exchangers 
(4) A switching arrangement ~or disconnecting the airplane batteries 
and generators ~rom the electrical power system 
The crash-fire study reported in re~erence 1 shows that all these com-
ponents are required to inert and de-energize the ignition sources that 
may start a crash ~ire. 
The ~ire-wall ~uel and oil valves stop the ~low o~ combustibles into 
the nacelles. This action limits the possibility or spread o~ ~ire ~ 
the ~uel or oil tubing is broken. 
The fuel shut-off valve between the carburetor and the fuel-
injection nozzle stops the engine and prevents the ~urther production of 
hot exhaust gases, exhaust torching, and backfires. Carbon dioxide is 
injected into the di~~user housing to inert the combustible mixture re-
maining in the engine induction system while the ~uel valve is closing) 
and the engine is purged with air. The carbon dioxide discharges with 
suf~icient velocity to mix uni~ormly and rapidly with the induction-
system ~uel-air mixture. 
The coolant spray system cools the hot metal o~ the collector ring 
and the heat-exchanger assemblies so that they are eliminated as potential 
ignition sources. This coolant is a solution o~ water and chemicals. 
The chemicals are used to depress the freezing point to _400 F. The 
steam ~rom this coolant solution inerts the atmosphere surrounding the 
exhaust disposal system while cooling occurs. 
The switching arrangement de-energizes the electrical power circuits 
so that arcs and sparks that would act as ignition sources are not created 
during the crash. Three components are needed in this system: (a) a 
relay that disconnects the electrical power circuits ~rom the generators 
and battery; (b) a second relay that connects the power circuit directly 
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to ground, thus rapidly decreasing the potential to zero; and (c) a time 
delay switch that de-energizes the initiating and inerting circuits after 
the inerting system has been actuated. For this crash, the airplane 
battery was moved to the cockpit floor from the nose-belly area where it 
is normally located to protect it against crash damage. This assured 
that power for actuating the fire-prevention system would be available 
for a longer time. 
These components of the inerting system are installed in an engine 
nacelle at the locations shown by the schematic diagram in figure 1. 
This crash-fire ignition-source inerting system is completely automatic, 
since the inerting system is actuated at the time of impact with the 
crash barrier by the crash-actuated initiating system. All components 
of this crash-fire prevention system are described completely in refer-
ence 2 . 
DESCRIPTION OF CRASH 
The procedure for such experimental crashes is fully described in 
reference 3. Briefly, however, the crash waS conducted in the following 
manner. The Ilnmanned airplane was guided by a rail along a 1700-foot 
paved runway at full power until it crashed into a series of obstacles 
at take-off speed (fig. 2). The first obstacles were two abutments, made 
of railroad ties and earth, placed in the path of the main landing 
wheels. These barriers removed the landing gear and damaged the propel-
lers and engines. Four poles then ripped open the fuel tanks in the 
wings. After being damaged, the airplane slid across an open area on 
its belly. The sliding airplane was enveloped by a large volume of fuel 
mist formed by the fuel spilling from the wings while the airplane was 
in motion. Because the fuel in vapor, mist, and liquid form was exten-
sively distributed, this crash was a severe test of the inerting system. 
INSTRUMENTATION AND DATA RECORDING 
Instruments were installed to measure the airplane acceleration 
after impact, the time to open or close each valve or relay, and the time 
each inerting-system component took to function. These data were recorded 
by one or more of the following recording systems: 
(1) Cameras photographing an instrument panel 
(2) Magnetic tape recorders 
(3) Telemetering equipment 
(4) Cameras installed around the crash area 
4 NACA RM E55Bll 
Of the four data-recording systems described, the most complete 
record of time histories was obtained by photographing an instrument 
panel in a fireproof box that was carried in the airplane. The instru-
ment panel held lamps that indicated the functioning time of switches, 
valves, and relays. Because of the low film speed (about 29 frames/sec), 
and also because of the lag in changes of light intensity of the 
lamps on the instrument panel, it was necessary to devise an interpola-
tion method of reading these data. By this method it was possible to 
interpret the photographic record of a particular event within ±0.004 
second. 
The data obtained by photographing the instrument panel included 
(1) Time 
(2) Backfire indication 
(3) Exhaust-disposal-system temperatures 
(4) F~l flow 
(5) F~l pressure 
(6) Time of airplane impact with barrier 
(7) Functioning time of the various inerting-system components 
(8) Fuel and oil shut-off time 
(9) Carbon dioxide pressure in lines from reservoir to engine inlet 
(Used to determine when C02 flow was fully established) 
(10) Coolant pressure in distribution line serving the hot exhaust-
disposal-system metal 
The magnetic-tape recorders obtained a time history of the inerting-
system operation. The telemetering equipment recorded impact accelera-
tions and engine displacement. Cameras installed around the crash area 
photographed the airplane as it progressed through the crash. 
Duplicate time histories of the inerting-system operation were ob-
tained by the cameras photographing the instrument panel and by the 
magnetic-tape recorders. These duplicate records were obtained to reduce 
the possibility of losing the data because of failure in one of the re-
cording systems. The methods of obtaining these data are described 
in reference 3. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Crash Damage 
In this experimental crash, initial impact with the wheel barrier 
occurred at a speed of 86 miles per hour. The airplane was damaged 
severely by the succession of crash events. The airplane slid 297 feet 
from the point of initial impact. The time after impact at which each 
of the crash events occurred was determined from the high-speed photo-
graphs taken from the camera stations and was checked by other data such 
as telemetered acceleration records. The crash events and the time 
after first impact at which they occurred is given in the following 
table: 
Crash event Time after impact, 
sec 
Propellers strike crash barrier (time zero) 0 
Main landing wheels strike crash barrier .095 
Wings strike first poles .273 
Belly strikes ground .380 
Wings strike second poles .758 
Airplane stops sliding 4.6 
The propellers of both the right and the left engines were bent from 
impact with the crash barrier as shown by photographs in figures 3(a) and 
(b), respectively. 
Fuel tanks 2 and 5 in both wings were pierced by the pole barriers. 
The extent of the damage to the left and right fuel tanks and wings is 
shown in figures 4(a) and (b), r e spectively. 
The engine nose-gear accessory housings were not damaged during the 
crash. Tubes i n the right engine mount were slightly bent but not broken. 
Figure 5 shows t he broken generator housing in the right engine nacelle. 
On t he right engine the exhaust-stack connecting sleeves were pulled out 
of cylinder 14 (fig. 6(a)) and cyl inder number 2 (fig. 6(b)). Two of the 
right-engine exhaust collec t or-ring mounting brackets were broken away from 
t heir suppor t when t heir mounting bolts were sheared. Figure 7 shows one 
of t hese brackets broken from t he support. The disruption of the exhaust 
stacks and shearing of the bolts were caused by the engine's twisting dur-
ing the crash . The exhaus t s ystem on the left engine was not damaged. 
The fuel and oil plumbing systems on b oth engines remained intact. 
Post-crash examination showed, however, that large amounts of fuel had 
reached the nacelles and exhaust stacks from the ruptured wing fuel tanks. 
The fuel path from the ruptured tanks could be traced by the dye that had 
been added to the fuel. The fuel ran along the bottom of the wing, down 
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the nacelle to the bottom of the fire wall near the fuel strainer. Fuel 
also ran into the wheel well and onto the landing gear retracting mech-
anism) inside the wheel well doors) and on the rear of the fire wall. 
The amount of fuselage crushing that occurred during the crash is 
shown in the photographs of the right and left sides of the airplane in 
figures S(a) and (bL respectively. The dotted lines in each figure 
define the original contour of the fuselage before the crash. In order 
to determine the extent of the crash damage to the skin and structure on 
the belly of the airplane) the fuselage was jacked up and examined. Fig-
ure 9 is a front view of the fuselage belly showing the damage to the 
skin and structure. The large opening in the center of the fuselage 
belly is the nose-gear well. The damage directly behind this opening 
was caused by the nose-gear strut's being driven rearward by impact with 
the ground and by the subsequent slide of the airplane. The skin and 
structure on each side of this opening was twisted and ripped. A front 
view of the nose gear and front bulkhead in figure 10 shows the struc-
tural damage to the bulkhead to which the nose-gear assembly was attached. 
This entire bulkhead was torn loose by the nose gear as it was driven 
rearward for approximately 9 feet by the force of the crash. Figure 
ll(a) shows the buckled floor and the structural damage in the left front 
portion of the cargo compartment. Damage to the structure in the right 
front portion of the cargo compartment is shown in figure ll(b). 
The results of previous experimental crashes such as described in 
reference 1 indicate that the conditions just described almost always 
result in fire when no crash-fire prevention system is employed. The in-
erting system was therefore exposed to conditions that would adequately 
test its ability to inert and de-energize the various ignition sources 
known to cause crash fires. The fact that fire did not occur during 
this crash indicated that the crash-fire prevention system functioned 
satisfactorily as a complete unit. 
Performance of Fire-Prevention System 
The performance of individual components of the fire-prevention 
system is described in the following paragraphs. The switching arrange-
ment that disconnects the airplane batteries and generators from the 
airplane power distribution system is described first. This sequence in 
presentation is necessary because short circuits in the airplane elec-
trical system affected the performance of various parts of the inerting 
system. 
Electrical system de-energizing. - The variation of voltage in the 
airplane electrical system during the crash is presented in figure 12. 
Impact of the airplane with the first crash barriers occurred at time 
zero. Two sharp reductions in voltage occurred at approximately 0.05 
-------- - --- - -
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and O.D. second after impact. These reductions in voltage were caused 
by short circuits when the generators were torn from their mountings. 
The relays in the inerting system that disconnect the generators and 
battery from the airplane electrical system opened at 0.12 second after 
impact. The airplane voltage began to drop immediately thereafter. Part 
of the voltage drop after 0.12 second was the result of this relay action. 
Closing of a relay that grounds the power circuit (shortly after the 
batteries and generators are disconnected) hastened this voltage reduc-
tion. The grounding relay is actuated by the inerting system. 
The electrical de-energizing action was complete when the voltage 
(fig. 12) reached zero at 0.178 second after impact. The 2-volt rise in 
potential thereafter could have been caused by the generator effect of 
coasting motors. Although the energy represented by this resurge of 
voltage may be marginal as an ignition source, it should be prevented by 
means of a better grounding system, as discussed in the following 
paragraph. 
The effect of the grounding relay in the fire-prevention system on 
the airplane electrical system voltage is shown in figure 13. The volt-
age variations recorded during this crash are compared with those obtained 
in pre crash trials of the electrical inerting system with and without a 
grounding relay. It can be seen from this figure that zero potential is 
obtained in a much shorter time with a grounding relay. The grounding 
relay used in the crash study had smaller contacts and lighter contact 
pressure than the relay used in the precrash studies. Because of these 
differences, the voltages in the pre crash studies reached zero 0.25 sec-
ond sooner than in the crash. In figure 13 Ifzerolf on the time coordinate 
is defined as the moment at which voltage was applied to the inerting 
system. 
Short circuits, such as occurred in this crash, could prevent proper 
functioning of the fire-prevention system. For this reason, a suitable 
method should be devised to prevent short circuits in the airplane elec-
trical system from influencing the output of the battery to the inerting 
system. If the battery is disconnected from the airplane electrical sys-
tem before take-off or landing, short circuits in the airplane electrical 
system could not damage the battery. Therefore, the battery will have 
full potential to operate the fire-prevention system. Disconnecting the 
battery would not appreciably affect the airplane electrical system 
because the generators are generally large enough to meet all electrical 
requirements. 
Inerting-system voltage. - The effect of the short circuits in the 
airplane electrical system on the voltage applied to the inerting-system 
components is presented in figure 14. The initiating system first applied 
voltage to the inerting-system components 0.09 second after impact. The 
second short circuit in the airplane electrical system occurred immedi-
ately thereafter and reduced the inerting voltage to zero, which delayed 
-----------
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the action of part of the inerting system. However, this short circuit 
quickly disappeared and both the airplane-electrical-system and the 
inerting-system voltage increased to battery potential (23 vOlts). The 
inerting-system voltage then remained at 23 volts from approximately 
0.12 to 0.26 second after impact. At 0.26 second after impact the time-
delay switch opened the circuit from the battery to the inerting system. 
The inerting voltage reached zero 0.27 second after impact and the inert-
ing system wiring could then no longer act as a potential ignition source. 
The varying voltage after 0.27 second wa's due to inductive effects in 
valve and relay coils. 
Although the first pulse of inerting voltage 0.09 second after im-
pact contained enough energy to actuate the explosive cartridge coolant 
valves, it only partially energized the coils in the other valves and 
relays. The coolant valves require little energy to operate because the 
explosive is ignited by a wire filament that heats rapidly. The other 
valves and relays require an electrical impulse of at least 0.02-second 
duration at full battery voltage to open or close. This value was ob-
tained from pre crash trials. 
Oil and fuel shut-off valves. - In order to evaluate the effect of 
crash acceleration on the operation of the oil and fuel valves, it was 
necessary to compare their functioning time during crash with those ob-
tained when the airplane was stationary. The effects of voltage varia-
tions can be eliminated by converting the interrupted voltage to a single 
impulse of equal energy. This approximate conversion (fig. 15) was ob-
tained by replacing areas A and Al by a rectangular pulse of the same 
area. The new area B represents a single uninterrupted pulse starting 
at 0.10 second rather than at 0.09 second as recorded. Therefore, volt-
age will be considered as having been applied at 0.10 second after impact, 
thus giving functioning-time data independent of the influence of the 
short circuit. 
The following table shows the time the oil and fuel shut-off valves 
took to function, after application of voltage, under crash conditions 
in which accelerations were experienced: 
Shut-off valve Functioning time, sec 
Left engine Right engine 
Oil 0.02 0.02 
Fuel (fire wall) .02 Unknown 
Fuel ( engine) .06 .02 
Four of the valves closed with the same speed under crash conditions as 
in pre crash trials. This indicates that these valves are insensitive to 
accelerations of the magnitude obtained in this crash. All these valves 
were found closed after the crash, including the one for which the closing 
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time was not obtained becaqse of failure in the indicating system. The 
recorded data for the left-engine fuel valve at the carburetor showed 
that it took 0.04 second longer to function than the other valves. This 
delay is also believed to have been caused by failures in the indicating 
system. The values of 0.02 second listed for the four valves are con-
sidered to be correct and representative. 
Because the fuel and oil shut-off valves can be actuated by an 
electrical impulse enduring for at least 0.02 second, an additional elec-
trical pulse, such as that resulting after a short circuit, could r~open a 
valve if it were closed by the first pulse. Fortunately, the first pulse 
of inerting voltage in this crash was too short to close these valves; 
thus, the second pulse helped to close instead of open them. Eliminating 
short circuits would prevent the possibility of reopening such valves. 
Induction-system inerting. - Carbon dioxide discharged into the dif-
fuser housing inerts the fuel-air mixture in the engine induction system 
while the fuel valve is clOSing and the engine is purging itself with 
air. Purging the engine with air takes about 0.2 second at normal take-
off power. The carbon dioxide pressure in the distribution line to the 
right-engine diffuser housing started to build up at 0.02 second after 
the carbon dioxide cylinder solenoid valve was energized, and reached 
its maximum operating pressure of 550 pounds per square inch gage in an 
additional 0.21 second. The carbon dioxide in the left engine was not 
discharged because the electrical connector had been inadvertently left 
off the operating head. Fortunately, in this instance, flames at the 
engine inlet and exhaust did not appear at the left engine and no fire 
occurred. 
It must be recognized, however, that crash circumstances can occur 
in which some part of the induction system is torn open at the same time 
that the carbon dioxide system is being energized and the valve is open-
ing. The combustible mixture in the induction system can then be spilled 
in the vicinity of the collector ring and be ignited while the carbon 
dioxide system is filling the distribution lines and beginning to dis-
charge into the diffuser housing. The carbon dioxide system cannot be 
expected to prevent such fires. Crash circumstances similar to those 
just described, however, apparently do not occur frequently. Induction 
systems were torn open in only 3 of the 42 engines involved in the ex-
perimental crashes conducted by the NACA. 
Exhaust-disposal-system cooling and inerting. - The exhaust-disposal-
system coolant flow for the right and left engines started at 0.23 and 
0.27 second, respectively, after the inerting voltage was applied to the 
valve. The steam and other gases from the evaporating coolant inerted 
the atmosphere around the collector ring soon after the coolant flow 
started. The full coolant flow on both engines lasted for 22 seconds. 
Mixed coolant and driving gas continued to flow for an additional 14 
seconds. 
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Both left and right exhaust disposal systems were cooled at essen-
tially the same rates as the experimental systems studied in previous 
crashes, indicating that these systems functioned properly. The lag of 
about 0.25 second before the coolant flow starts introduces the possibil-
ity of fire starting from fuel or oil spilled on the collector ring during 
this interval. The fuel or oil plumbing would not provide such combus-
tibles, however, because the rapid actuation of the fuel and oil shut-off 
valves prevents fuel or oil from being sprayed on the collector ring from 
either of these systems during this 0.25-second interval. Fuel-air mix-
ture spilled from a broken induction system, as described in the preced-
ing paragraph, could reach the exhaust collector ring and be ignited 
before the collector-ring cooling system can function. Oil from a broken 
propeller reduction gear housing could conceivably reach the collector 
ring during this interval. A study of the crashes in which the experi-
mental inerting system was used shows, however, that fire did not result 
during this 0.25-second interval, apparently because the time required 
for the oil to reach the collector ring plus the residence time required 
for ignition is equal to or greater than the 0.25 second lag in the action 
of the coolant system. The reduction gear housing was ruptured in 8 of 
the 28 engines involved in these crashes. Oil spilling from the ruptured 
reduction gear housing did not ignite on any of these 8 engines. 
The temperature history of the right-engine exhaust collector ring 
(fig. 16) indicates that it took 17.5 seconds for the hottest portion of 
the exhaust collector ring to cool to 9500 F, the lowest temperature at 
which gasoline will ignite readily on the external surfaces of the exhaust 
system, and 24 seconds t o cool t o 7600 F, the lowest temperature at which 
lubricating oil was observed to ignite readily. The temperatures continued 
to fall well below these critical values) indicating that the cooling sys-
tem cooled the exhaust collector ring enough so that it was no longer an 
ignition source. 
The temperature history of an exhaust heat exchanger (fig. 17) shows 
that the hottest part of the heat exchanger had been cooled to 8500 F by 
the time the flow of coolant and driving gas stopped. Precrash studies 
showed that neither gasoline nor oil would ignite on these heat-exchanger 
surfaces at this temperature. The relatively stagnant atmosphere of inert 
gases within the heat exchanger evidently continued to protect this zone 
while the heat exchanger continued to cool by radiation and conduction. 
The data presented in figure 16 were taken from the right engine; the 
data from the left engine are essentially similar. 
The coolant used in the earlier experimental inerting systems (ref. 1) 
was water, whereas in this prototype system the coolant was a mixture of 
water and chemicals. Figure 18 compares the cooling effectiveness of 
water and the coolant solution f or the exhaust collector ring. These 
data were obtained from a preliminary study made before the airplane was 
crashed. The results indicate that the rate of temperature decrease was 
approximately the same for water and the coolant solution. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This prototype inerting system functions with a rapidity equal to 
or greater than that of the experimental system used for the NACA crash-
fire studies (ref. 1) . The following table gives a comparison of the 
functioning times for the experimental and the prototype inerting-system 
components: 
Inerting-system components Functioning 
Experimental 
Fuel shut-off valves ( a) 
Oil s hut-off valve s (b) 
Carbon dioxide induction inerting system 
pre ssure 0.06 
Coolant spray syst em 0.19 to 0 .40 
Airplane electrical system de-energizing 0.10 
~ot measured in same manner; no comparison possible. 
bNot used. 
time, sec 
Prototype 
0.02 
0.02 
0.05 
0.23 to 0.27 
0.08 
The "functioning time" for the carbon dioxide systems is the time re-
quired for the pressure t o reach 75 pounds per square inch gage at the 
nozzle of the injection system. 
The functi oning times for the carbon dioxide systems that i nert t he 
engine i nduction system are about equal, which could be expected because 
the equipment was essentially the same. The coolant spray systems were 
also similar, although refinements decreased the functi oning time of the 
prototype system. The airplane electrical system was de-energized some-
what mor e rapidly by t he pr ototype s ystem, which used faster relays and an 
i mpr oved grounding system. On the basis of the test results, it is con-
cluded t hat the prototype crash-fire prevention system is generally more 
eff ective t han the experimental system . 
Further improvements, however, can be made in the prototype system. 
These improvements should decrease the time interval between the instant 
of first impact and the full operation of the complete fire-prevention 
system. In other words, the functioning speed of both the initiating 
and the inerting components of the system should be increased. 
As an example of the need for rapid component actuation, a pole 
passing through the wing of a crashed airplane can tear through the wing 
e lectrical wiring and fuel storage, placing spilled fuel in contact with 
electrical sparks before the protection system is actuated. It appears 
essential, then, that the crash-sensing switch in the wing be arranged 
to i mmediately switch off all electrical power in the wing circuits not 
needed for airplane control at the instant the wing is penetrated. 
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As a means of providing more time for the fire-prevention system to 
function, the airplane electrical wiring in the wing should be moved to 
the trailing edge. This would give the electrical grounding system a 
longer time to decrease the power-circuit voltage to zero. Electrical 
wires can also be sheathed in .loose elastic sleeves that would remain 
intact until the wires break . In this way any arc resulting from a break 
will be shielded from combustibles until the arc is quenched. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This experimental crash study shows that the prototype inerting sys-
tem was exposed to conditions that would adequately test its ability to 
inert and de-energize the various ignition sources known to cause crash 
fires. 
The fact that fire did not occur indicates that the crash-fire pre-
vention system functioned satisfactori l y as a complete unit. 
The study also shows that further improvements can be made in the 
crash-fire inerting system if the following recommendations are adopted: 
(1) Devise a method to prevent short circuits in the main airplane 
electrical system from diverting the power needed for inerting-system 
actuation and from reopening the solenoid fuel valves. 
(2) Provide a means of disconnecting noncritical wing power circuits 
from power sources as soon as a wing is penetrated. 
(3) Where possible, install wing wiring in the wing trailing edge. 
This wire should be of the shielded type so that it will break inside 
the shield. In this way any arc resulting from a break will be shielded 
from combustibles until the arc is quenched. 
Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory 
National Advisory Committee f or Aeronautics 
Cleveland, Ohio, February 15, 1955 
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3672 
--_ .. _.- _ . . _- -
t-' 
~ 
~ 
~ 
§! 
t?;j 
(Jl 
(Jl 
lJ:j 
t-' 
t-' 
5672 
...-'" 
...- \ 
...-
...-
,-
...-
...-
/' 
/' 
,-
...-
,-
Crash area~ 
Abutments \\// ,- ~ Approach runway~ 
: f - , , 
"-
"- , 
, 
"-
"- , 
, 
, 
"- , 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
"- , 
, 
, 
"- , 
I CD-4694 I ..... / 
Figure 2. - Schematic drawing of crash site for conducting experimental crashes. 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
/ 
I 
I 
/ 
/ 
/ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
J 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
~ 
fi! 
t:o;I 
U1 
m 
..... 
..... 
t-' 
U1 
----
(a) Right engine. 
Figure 3 . - Propeller damage produced by crash barriers. 
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(b) Left engine. 
Figure 3. - Concluded . Propeller damage produced by crasb barriers. 
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(a) Left side. 
Figure 4. - Damage to wing and fuel tanks produced by pole barriers. 
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(b) Right side. 
Fi gure 4 . - Concluded. Damage to wing and fuel tanks produced by pole barriers. 
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Figure 5 . - Broken generator mounting flanges in right-engine nacelle . 
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(a) Cylinder 14. 
Figure 6. - Gap in right-engine exhaust-stack connecting sleeve. 
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(b) Cylinder 2. 
Figure 6. - Concluded. Gap in right- engine exhaust-stack connecting sleeve. 
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Figure 7. - Exhaust-collector-ring mounting bracket broken from its support. 
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(a) Right side. 
Figure 8. - Crash- damaged fuselage of airplane. 
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Figure 8. - Concluded . Crash-damaged fuselage of airplane. 
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Figure 10. - Crash-damaged interior of nose-gear well. 
~-- . --
~ (") 
~ 
~ 
I?=J 
tTl 
tTl 
tJj 
t-' 
t-' 
N 
-..I 
l 
I 
I 
( a) Left front. 
Figure 11. - Crash-damaged interior of cargo compartment. 
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(b) Right front. 
Figure 11. - Concluded. Crash-damaged interior of cargo compartment. 
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Figure 12. - Variation a:f voltage in airpl..5.ne electrical system. 
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Figure 13. - Effec t of grounding on airplane electrical sys tem voltage. 
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Figure 14. - Effect of short circuits in airplane electrical system on vol tage applied to iner ting-system components . 
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Figure 15. -Voltage applied to inertlng system components. 
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Figure 16. - Temperature history of right-engine exhaust collector ring. 
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Figure 17. - Temperature history of right-engine exhaust heat exchanger. 
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Figure 18. - Cooling effectiveness of water and coolant solution as indicated by temperature 
of exhaust collector ring. 
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